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ABSTRACT 
The following paper investigates the nature and scope of section 7 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and its role in safeguarding the rights 
contained in that Act. It uses case studies of proposed, later enacted, legislation 
which contain (at least prima facie) inconsistent provisions, to trace the 
effectiveness of section 7 as it is implemented by vetting agencies, and considered 
by the Attorney-General and Parliament. 
It started from the premise that it is a feel-good provision; effectively 
' smoke and mirrors ' simply diluting the fact that the Bill of Rights was not 
supreme, entrenched legislation. The objective was to establish this. However, 
the paper develops a different conclusion. 
In light of section 7's stated purposes as a generator of constructive debate 
in the House on Bill of Rights issues and a constitutional safeguard, it became 
apparent from the case studies that section 7 achieved its purpose to a limited 
extent. The objective of the paper became to identify why it was only a limited 
obstacle to the enactment of inconsistent legislation and further, suggest options 
which would aid a greater realisation of its potential. That is, the objective 
became to morph a single orange plastic cone into an armed defenders highway 
closure. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights), enacted to 
affirm a range of civil and political rights, also contains a mechanism for alerting 
Parliament to Bill of Rights inconsistencies in draft legislation. Section 7 
requires the Attorney-General to report to the House of Representatives on any 
provision of any bill introduced to the House that appears inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights. 
Its purpose was to manifest a constitutional safeguard, presenting 
Parliament with an "obstacle" 1 to enacting inconsistent legislation and generating 
constructive debate of Bill of Rights issues in the House. 
Over a decade following enactment of the Bill of Rights, this paper is the 
result of an examination of the nature and scope of section 7, and its day-to-day 
procedural practicalities in light of case studies concerning controversial 
provts10ns in the Land Transport Act 1998, recent changes to bail, and 
retrospective penalty provisions in Criminal Justice Amendment legislation. 
It assesses whether section 7 is fulfilling its purported purpose, or whether 
it is in fact inadequate, being only a single orange plastic cone charged with road-
blocking the abrogation of fundamental human rights. Further, it presents some 
options to allow section 7 to operate to its intended potential , that of an armed 
defenders highway-closure, aiding to prevent, at least inadvertent, enactment of 
inconsistent legislation. 
Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer (21 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3760. 
2 
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II SECTION 7: NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
A Tlte Nature of Section 7 
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights states2 
7. Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be inconsistent 
with Bill of Rights - Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the 
Attorney-General shall, -
(a) In the case ofa Government Bill on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, -
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that 
appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights. 
The proV1s10n applies to all introduced legislation requmng, first, the 
identification of inconsistencies and, second, those inconsistencies to be reported 
to the House of Representatives by the Attorney-General . 
Section 7 is thus3 
a safeguard designed to alert members of Parliament to legislation which may give rise to 
an inconsistency and accordingly enable them to debate the proposals on that basis. 
Since the 1995 revisions to the Standing Orders this obligation has been 
fulfilled by the presentation of a report, which is published as a parliamentary 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney General [1994] 2 NZLR 451 , ~57 Gallen J. 
6 
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paper.4 Current practice dictates that a report 1s only tabled where there are 
unjustified inconsistencies identified. 
The obligation imposed by section 7 upon the Attorney General is not a 
right enforceable by a citizen. 
B Section 7 as an Enforceable Right 
In 1994, in the context of changes to the Forests Amendment Act 1993, an 
action was brought against the Attorney General for failing to bring provisions in 
the Forests Amendment Bill which were allegedly inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights, to the attention of the House of Representatives. 
Gallen J, reinforcing the Court' s inability to usurp the authority of 
Parliament, held that the obligation imposed upon the Attorney-General by 
section 7 was a part of the proceedings in Parliament (whether or not the 
Attorney-General decides to table a report) and is therefore encompassed by 
article 9(1) of the Bill of Rights 1688 which provides5 
the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament. 
Further, the Bill of Rights is not entrenched and section 7 itself 
contemplates the possibility that inconsistent legislation may be initiated and 
accepted by Parliament. Gallen J stated6 
New Zealand House of Representatives Report of the Standing Orders Committee on the Review 
of Standing Orders, Wellington, 1995, 51 ; cited in Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Dr Matthew Palmer 
Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 
272. 
Bill of Rights Act 1688 (UK), art 9(1) . 
Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney General above, 457 Gallen J. 
7 
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there is nothing to stop Parliament from legislating in some manner inconsistent with the 
New Zealand Bi11 of Rights Act 1990. 
In conclusion, Gallen J, recognising the impact of section 4 on section 7 
when read together, refused to accept section 7 as a right enforceable by the 
Courts. 
C Section 7's Existence: In Context 
There was no section 7 in the proposed, White Paper, Bill of Rights.
7 It 
was unnecessary as the rights contained in the bill were protected by the nature of 
the bill itself; being supreme, entrenched legislation. 
The Justice and Law Reform Select Committee, who inquired into the 
White Paper, recommended a Bill of Rights implemented through ordinary 
legislation. This was in response to concerns that a supreme Bill of Rights would 
infringe the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. With its inherent protection 
expropriated, section 7 was introduced to protect the rights from legislative 
derogation and abrogation. The committee felt 
8 
that if the Bill of Rights had a prophylactic effect on new legislation, this would 
compensate in part for the subordination of the Bill of Rights to all other legislation. 
It was inspired by the Canadian Charter requirement that the Minister of 
Justice scrutinise all bills and regulations against the rights in the Charter, and 
report inconsistencies to the House of Commons "at the first convenient 
opportunity".9 However, that provision alone does not provide the protection 
from legislative derogation; the Charter' s status as supreme law protects the rights 
Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984-1985) AJHR I.A6. 
Andrew S Butler "Strengthening the Bill of Rights" (2000) 31 VUWLR 129, 145. 
Canadian Charter of Rights, section 3; cited in Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report 
on a White Paper Bi11 of Rights for New Zealand" [1987-1990) XVII .AJHR I.SC, 10. 
10 
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contained in it. Therefore, section 7 effects only a diluted vers10n of its 
inspiration. It is diluted further by the repercussions of a neighbouring provision. 
D The Impact of Section 4 on Section 7 
While it was intended that the Bill of Rights would "put obstacles in the 
way of the Executive when it is framing its legislative proposals" and would be 
"extraordinarily helpful and beneficial in ensuring that legislation conforms to 
basic principles, important standards, and real legal tests"10 the impact of the 
provisions contained in the Act on each other casts doubt on well-intentioned 
policy. 
Isolated, section 7 is a staunch protector of our rights and freedoms, but 
read in conjunction with section 4 its effectiveness is considerably diluted. 
Section 4 states that 11 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or 
to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this BiJI of Rights. 
(Emphasis added) 
Section 4, reinforcing the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty and 
consequentially establishing the non-binding status of a section 7 report, allows 
the House to legislate contrary to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Section 7 
merely ensures it does so knowingly. 
Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer (21 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3760. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
12 
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E The Scope of Section 7 
A literal interpretation of the provision suggests the Attorney-General's 
obligation is satisfied following initial scrutiny and reporting ( or decision not to) 
on all proposed legislation. This interpretation means that changes and 
amendments implemented following select committee recommendations and/or 
Committee of the Whole House are not checked for consistency with the Bill of 
Rights. 
A purposive interpretation of section 7, in line with the widely accepted 
approach to the interpretation of human rights guarantees 12, would require section 
7 scrutiny procedures to pervade other stages of the legislative process, requiring 
ongoing reporting by the Attorney-General to place these inconsistencies before 
the House. 
The latter approach has been theoretically accepted by the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ) who have suggested that13 
nothing in section 7 precludes the Attorney-General from reporting inconsistencies at any 
time after a Bill' s introduction, but the objective is alerting the House at the earliest 
opportunity. 
However, a purposive interpretation of section 7 is construed by the MoJ 
as creating a negative discretion, (as opposed to a positive obligation), to report 
inconsistencies which arise later in the legislative process. Further, they have not 
implemented procedures to monitor the legislative progress of a bill making it 
difficult to exercise the discretion. Therefore, the MoJ's stance is, arguably, a 
feel-good one. Effectively, the literal interpretation of the scope of section 7 has 
See A Shaw and AS Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Cornes Alive" [1991] NZI..J 261 . 
See also the New Zealand Court of Appeal's position stated in Flickinger v Crown Colony of 
Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439 (CA). 
Ministry of Justice "BORA Vetting" (Draft) (Advice to Attorney-General, 22 November 1999). 
14 
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prevailed since the Bill of Rights' enactment despite it being "seriously at odds 
with accepted canons of interpretation for Human Rights guarantees" .
14 
F A Parallel Requirement 
Standing Order (SO) 260 of the House of Representatives requires the 
Attorney-General to indicate to the House if any bill appears inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights. SO 260(1) states15 
Whenever a bill contains any provision which appears to the Attorney-General to be 
inconsistent with any rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, the Attorney Genera~ before a motion for the bill's [first)16
 reading is moved, must 
indicate to the House what that provision is and how it appears to be inconsistent with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Like section 7, this requirement is manifested in a published paper tabled 
in the House. 17 While the section 7 obligation and the Standing Order obligation 
are theoretically separate requirements, they have been, since inception, treated as 
a single reporting requirement; the SO 260 obligation being subsumed by, and 
fulfilled through, the section 7 vetting procedure. 
(Released following request pursuant to the Official Information Act 1982). 
Paul Fitzgerald "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A very practical power or 
a well-intentioned nonsense?" (1992) 22 VUWLR 135, 155. 
House of Representatives Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (Wellington, 8 
September 1999), SO 260(1). 
This read "second reading" until it was amended by Sessional Order to read "first reading" in 
May 2000. This is discussed in greater detail in Part V.A.4(c) of this paper. 
House of Representatives Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (Wellington, 8 
18 
19 
20 
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III THE SECTION 7 VETTING PROCEDURE 
A Background Information 
The MoJ and the Crown Law Office (CLO) have developed procedures for 
checking proposed legislation for compliance with the Bill of Rights to advise the 
Attorney-General. 18 This process is referred to as Bill of Rights Act vetting.
19 
On20, or as soon as practicable following21 , their introduction bills not 
sponsored by the MoJ are vetted for consistency by MoJ officials. Bills within the 
portfolio area of the Minister of Justice, to avoid a potential conflict of interest, 
are vetted by the CLO. This practice dates back to 1991 and is reinforced in the 
Cabinet Office Manual.22 
Advice resulting from a three-stage analysis of all bills is tendered to the 
Attorney-General. Immediately following enactment of the Bill of Rights Act 
the (then) Attorney-General, Hon Paul East, required formal written advice only 
where the provisions of a bill were considered to warrant a report to the House 
under section 7. Since then, the Attorney-General (both Hon Doug Graham and 
currently Hon Margaret Wilson) request written advice as to consistency of ail 
Government bills prior to their introduction and advice on all other bills as soon 
as possible after their first reading.
23 
September 1999), SO 260(2). 
Other agencies (for example, the Legislation Advisory Committee (LAC) have developed 
guidelines also, and while the same or similar, for the purposes of this paper, information regarding 
the vetting process is taken from Ministry of Justice documents as footnoted. For the LAC 
guidelines see Legislation Advisory Committee legislation Advisory Commillee Guidelines: 
Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (2001 edition) (Wellington, 2001) 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/lac/index.html> (last accessed 26 September 2001 ), para 4.1.1 - 4.1.3 . 
Ministry of Justice "Untitled" (Draft) (9 March 2000), 1. (Released following request 
pursuant to the Official Information Act 1982). 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s7(a) . 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s7(b). 
Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, 
2001) 69, para 5.39. 
Ministry of Justice "BoRA Vetting" (Draft) (To Attorney-General, 22 N_ovember 1999) 4. 
24 
2S 
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B Outline of the Analysis 
The MoJ and CLO follow the statutory interpretation methodology 
articulated and adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Moonen v Film 
and Literature Board of Review (Moonen). 24 When developing the methodology, 
the Court of Appeal were undoubtedly (though not expressly) influenced by the 
test expounded by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v Oakes (Oakes). 25 
The Oakes test had been used in this part of the vetting process prior to Moonen, 
but the latter judgment has provided clarity. However, much of the relevant case 
law used by vetting officials is found in judgments of the Canadian Courts dealing 
with comparable provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26 
I Identifying an inconsistency 
The vetting process is made up of three separate stages. First, the policy 
objectives and provisions of the bill are assessed for compliance with the rights 
and freedoms within the Bill of Rights. 
This step involves 
(I) identifying and weighing the different interpretations available
27 of 
the apparently inconsistent objective and/or provision; 
(2) ascertaining the scope of the right apparently breached; and 
(3) assessing the objective and/or provision in light of the right itself 
to ascertain whether the objective and/or provision in fact breaches 
the right. 
(Released following request pursuant to the Official lnfonnation Act 1982). 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
Regina v Oakes (1986) 24 CCC (3d) 321 ; (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SC). 
Ministry of Justice "BORA Vetting" (Draft) (To Attorney-General, 22 November 1999) 3. 
This has been understood to mean "properly open" (Moonen v Film and Literature Board of 
Review above, I 0). 
28 
14 
2 The "reasonableness" analysis 
If there is an inconsistency, it is determined whether the inconsistency is a 
"reasonable limit ... demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".28 
This is essentially the analysis required of the courts by section 5 of the Bill of 
Rights. The approach expounded by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Moonen is directly imported to assist in this inquiry. It essentially consists of two 
components: 
(1) Determining whether the limit is substantively justified, the test 
requiring the limitation to be of sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding a constitutionally protected right; and 
(2) Determining whether the limit is proportional, the test 
requiring proportionality between the law limiting the right and the 
reason for the limitation, ie . the measures adopted must impair the 
right as little as possible. 
The incorporation of the section 5 analysis in the vetting procedure results 
in only unjustified limits being considered to be inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights. Therefore, Parliament is not made aware only of prima facie 
inconsistencies, only unjustified ones. 
3 Advice and Section 7 Reports 
The legal advice resulting from the above procedure is tendered to the 
Attorney-General who is free to accept or reject it. Where an unjustified 
inconsistency is identified a section 7 report is drafted by the vetting agency and 
attached to the letter of advice. If accepted, it is tabled in the House by the 
Attorney-General. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s S. 
29 
15 
As noted above, section 7 reports are only tabled in the House where an 
impugned provision is considered to be an unjustified limitation on the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act. The report may include options for 
consideration if it is decided to amend the impugned provision to comply with the 
Bill of Rights.29 
C The Analysis in Application 
I Identifying an inconsistency 
When a bill first comes before the vetting agency the objective that the 
policy is seeking to achieve is ascertained. Once that is determined, it is 
considered alongside the rights and freedoms contained within the Bill of Rights. 
Once a potential breach of a right or rights is identified the objective is assessed 
in light of the right itself to determine whether it in fact breaches the right. 
If the objective is in some way inconsistent with the Bill of Rights' 
protections the bill is then scrutinised, applying section 5 principles, to establish 
whether the objective is a justified limitation on the affected rights. 
If the objective is consistent with protected rights the resulting legislation 
must also be consistent. Therefore, each provision of the bill is examined to 
ascertain its compliancy with the Bill of Rights. 
Generally there will be a number of ways that a provision can be worded 
with the same objective in mind. The formulation that both achieves the objective 
For example, then Attorney-General Hon Paul East suggested a number of possibilities 
in his report on both the Films and Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 and the 
Children, Young Persons and their Families Amendment Act 1996 for the select committee to 
address. 
30 
31 
32 
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of the legislation and is most consistent with the Bill of Rights is identified. Once 
an interpretation, "properly open"30 on the words of the provision, is determined 
it is considered alongside the rights contained in the Act and potential breaches 
are identified. The provision is then examined in light of the right itself to 
ascertain whether the provision is justified in all the circumstances. 
2 A justified limitation? 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights, read in conjunction with section 4, is a 
statutory recognition that the State has a legitimate interest in limiting some 
rights.3' A provision which is prima facie inconsistent with a right or rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights is deemed to be consistent when it is justified in a 
free and democratic society. 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act provides32 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Assessing whether an impugned provision is justified, in essence, consists 
of two primary components. 
(a) Substantive justification 
First, the objective of the impugned proV1s10n 1s identified. The 
importance and significance of that objective is then assessed,
33 
because the 
reason for the limitation must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
Moonen v Film and Literature Review Board, above, 10. 
Ministry of Justice, "Untitled" (Draft) (9 March 2000) 5. (Released following request pursuant to 
the Official Information Act 1982). 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
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constitutionally protected right or freedom. Information from the Department 
responsible for a Bill can be important at this stage.34 
(b) Proportionality 
The way in which the objective is statutorily achieved must be in 
reasonable proportion to the importance of the objective. That is, "a sledge 
hammer should not be used to crack a nut".35 
The test of proportionality consists of three components:36 
(1) The measures adopted must be rationally connected37 to the 
objective; 
(2) the measures should impair as little as possible the right or 
freedom in question; and 
(3) there must be proportionality between the law limiting the right 
and the objective of the limitation, that is, the limitation must not 
be so deleterious of a right as to outweigh the substantive 
justification for the limitation. 
At the second stage it is recognised that, in achieving the specific 
objective of the limiting legislation, although the particular right should be 
impaired no more than is necessary to meet the objective, there is a margin of 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board({/ Review, above, 11 . 
Ministry of Justice "BORA Vetting" (Draft) (To Attorney-General, 22 November 1999) 3. 
(Released following request pursuant to Official Information Act 1982). 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, above, 11 . 
Ministry of Justice "BORA Vetting" (Draft) (To Attorney-General, 22 November 1999) 3. 
(Released following request pursuant to Official Information Act 1982). 
The "rational connection" terminology is used by the Canadian Supreme Court in Regina v 
Oakes, above; the New Zealand Court of Appeal inquire whether there is a "rational relationship" 
between the objective and the right affected in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, 
above. (Emphasis added). 
38 
18 
error within which reasonable legislators could disagree.38 This principle 
acknowledges the inherent subjectiveness of the inquiry. 
If a provision satisfies the Moonen test, the MoJ or CLO will advise the 
Attorney-General that the provision is a justified limitation under section 5 and is 
therefore consistent with the Bill of Rights. A section 7 report will not be 
produced. 
3 Tabling a Report 
After a finding of a unjustified inconsistency in a bill advice outlining the 
analysis is tendered to the Attorney-General, along with a draft section 7 report. 
The Attorney-General is free to reject or accept the advice and the report, but if it 
is accepted she tables the report in the House of Representatives. It is then 
available to the relevant Select Committee and the House during the bill's 
legislative progress. 
Once tabled, section 7 reports are public documents, published in the 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives. 
IV CASE STUDIES ILLUSTRATING THE APPLICATION AND 
EFFECT OF SECTION 7 
To assess the practical effect of section 7 in the legislative process three 
core bills containing potentially inconsistent provisions have been chosen 
randomly. Their legislative process will be traced and assessed in this part of the 
paper. 
See Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-kut [ 1993] 3 All ER 939, 954 (PC). 
39 
40 
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A The Land Transport Act 1998 
The Land Transport Bill was tabled in Parliament by a National 
government, the measures in which reflected "the Government's determination to 
make [New Zealand] roads safer"39. 
The Ministry of Transport was the sponsoring department, so the vetting 
procedure was undertaken by the MoJ. Three clauses in the Bill were reported as 
being inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act and the (then) Attorney-General , 
Hon Paul East, tabled a section 7 report in the House of Representatives. 
I The Impugned Clauses 
The three identified clauses concerned evidential presumptions relating to 
alcohol testing, and 28-day licence suspension and vehicle impoundment. 
(a) Clause 117: Presumptions relating to alcohol-testing 
Clause 117, paragraphs (1) and (2) stated:40 
(1) For the purposes of proceedings for an offence against this Act arising out of 
the circwnstances in respect of which an evidential breath test was undergone by the 
defendant, it is to be conclusively presumed that the proportion of alcohol in the 
defendant's breath at the time of the alleged offence, was the same as the proportion of 
alcohol in the defendant's breath indicated by the test. 
(2) For the purposes of proceedings for an offence against this Act arising out of the 
circwnstances in respect of which a blood specimen was taken from the defendant .. it is 
to be conclusively presumed that the proportion of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the 
time of the alleged offence was the same as the proportion of alcohol in the blood 
specimen taken from the defendant. 
Hon Maurice Williamson (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5746. 
Land Transport Bill I 997, no 87-1, cl 117. 
41 
42 
43 
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The Attorney-General's report stated that clause 117 was inconsistent with 
section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act which states:
41 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of the 
charge, ... 
( c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
Canadian decisions on the basis of the equivalent proVIsIOn m the 
Canadian Charter were used in the report to substantiate the report's conclusion. 
It had been held by a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court that 
42 
any burden on an accused which has the effect of dictating a conviction despite the 
presence of reasonable doubt, whether that burden relates to proof of an essential element 
of the offence or some element extraneous to the offence but nonetheless essential to the 
verdict contravenes [the equivalent section] of the [Canadian] Charter. 
Other Canadian decisions indicated that issues surrounding conclusive-
presumption provisions arise from the possibility that an accused could be 
convicted while a reasonable doubt exists.
43 
Further, a similar, but less intrusive, alcohol-testing proVIs1on was 
introduced in the Canadian Criminal Code which created a rebuttable 
presumption; that tests are proof in the absence of evidence to the contrary. This 
was deemed by the judiciary to be contrary to the Canadian Charter. As the law 
stands now in Canada only a reasonable doubt need be raised by a defendant to 
rebut the proof of the tests. 
New Zea.land Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25( c) . 
R v Holmes [ 1988] l SCR 914, 934 Dickson CJ. 
In R v Whyte (1988) 51 DLR (4th) 481 the Court held that the presumption of innocence 
44 
45 
46 
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The extent of clause 117 ' s inconsistency, in the Attorney-General's 
opinion, was substantial. The report questioned whether the clause abrogated the 
section 25 right, rather than merely limited it. Preceding on the basis that the 
clause imposed a limit on the right, a section 5 analysis of the clause was 
reported. 
Using the Oakes test (Moonen not yet having been decided) the following 
factors were balanced:44 
(1) The significance in the particular case of the values underlying the 
Bill of Rights Act; 
(2) The importance in the public interest of intrusion on the particular 
right protected by the Bill of Rights Act; 
(3) The limits sought to be placed in the application of the Act's 
provision in the particular case; and 
( 4) The effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put 
forward to justify those limits. 
The report identified the objective of the proV1s1on as being the 
"substantial and pressing need to control problems created by drinking drivers, 
namely deaths and injuries on our roads.',45 It considered the objective and the 
provision to be rationally connected "because it is based upon empirical data 
previously accepted by parliament which rationally connects the proved and 
presumed facts".46 
It assessed the extent of the impairment on the right in question in light of 
the bill ' s objective. There was an awareness of Police concerns that any 
applies regardless of whether the clause in question creates a presumption dispensing with proof of 
a fact otherwise required to be proved in order to establish a Crown case or establishes a separate 
defence which the defendant is required to prove. 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [1997] AJHR E63 , 6. 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [ 1997] AJHR E63 , 7. 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [ 1997] AJHR E63, _7. 
47 
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relaxation of the conclusive presumption rule would lead to difficulties in 
prosecuting drink-driving offences, with more resources required to be devoted 
to prosecutions, legal uncertainty and higher rates of acquittals. Against these 
concerns was weighed evidence that if alcohol is consumed immediately prior to 
apprehension, a person's blood/alcohol level reading may continue to rise for a 
period after consumption has ceased. The report emphasised the importance of 
recognising that the conclusive presumption is capable of operating in such a way 
as to lead to the conviction of persons who in fact were under the relevant legal 
breath or blood alcohol limit, can demonstrate this fact, and may in no way be at 
fault. This was seen as being in "complete conflict"47 with the values underlying 
the presumption of innocence. These findings, coupled with the fact that clause 
117 is more severe than that adopted in Australia and Canada, resulted in the 
conclusion that the clause did not infringe the right in question as little as 
possible. 
The report ' s final conclusion was that clause 117 infringed the rights 
conferred by section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights in a manner that could not be 
treated as a reasonable limit for the purposes of section 5 of the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
(b) Clauses 56 and 57: 28-day licence suspension and vehicle impoundment 
Clause 56 of the Land Transport Bill provided for the immediate 
suspension of a driver' s licence for a period of 28 days where the driver had been 
caught driving with excess breath 48 or blood-alcohol
49 levels, had failed or 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [ 1997] AJHR E63, 7. 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 56(I)(a)(i). 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 56(1)(a)(ii). 
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50 
refused to undertake a blood test when requested to , or driven at a speed 50 
kilometres an hour in excess of the applicable speed limit
51
. 
Clause 57 of the Bill provided for the mandatory impoundment of a motor 
vehicle for a period of 28 days where the driver was disqualified from holding or 
obtaining a driver licence52 , the driver's licence was suspended or revoked
53
, or 
the driver was unlicensed54 . 
There was no provts10n to enable a Court, imposing sentence for an 
offence relating to the conduct which gave rise to the licence suspension or 
vehicle impoundment, to terminate the licence suspension or vehicle 
impoundment. 
The Attorney-General identified these clauses as being potentially 
inconsistent with section 26(2) of the Bill of Rights Act in so far as they did not 
provide for the termination of suspension and impoundment. 
Section 26(2) of the Bill of Rights contains the double jeopardy rule which 
states55 : 
No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of or pardoned for an offence shall be 
tried or punished for it again. 
The report recognised that the scope of section 26(2) in New Zealand is 
uncertain but proceeded on the basis that even if a narrow interpretation was 
taken sanctions of a penal nature come within the scope of the section. 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1, cl 56(1 )(b). 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 56(l)(c). 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 57(l)(a). 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 57(1)(b). 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 57(l)(c). 
55 
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The report considered similar suspens10n regimes m overseas 
jurisdictions. In the United States the Ohio Supreme Court held that 
administrative licence suspension and subsequent prosecution did not infringe a 
double jeopardy provision in the Constitution, but that an administrative licence 
suspension ceases to be remedial and becomes punitive in nature to the extent 
that the suspension continues subsequent to adjudication and sentencing
56
. The 
scheme in issue in that case involved suspension for a minimum of 90 days and 
up to five years on subsequent occasions, so New Zealand's proposed scheme was 
distinguishable on that basis, however, in another American case the court held 
that a seven day licence suspension was contrary to double jeopardy protections. 
57 
The objective of the proposed clauses 56 and 57 was identified in the 
report, taken from draft Cabinet Committee papers, as being deterrence by the 
"imposition of swift, certain and severe penalties on serious and repeat traffic 
off enders "58 . 
The section 5 analysis involved the weighing of the factors outlined 
above. The report ' s ' substantive justification' assessment took into account 
suggestions by the Ministry of Transport that a provision automatically 
terminating administratively imposed licence suspension or impoundment may 
operate to frustrate the legislative intention of the regime by reducing its deterrent 
effect and/or allowing drivers who present a risk to public safety to regain their 
vehicles and/or be able to use their licences at an inappropriately early stage after 
h · 59 appre ens1on. 
The report found that allowing the continuation of a licence suspension or 
irnpoundment regime following sentencing is rationally connected with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s26(2). 
Ohio v Gustafson 668 NE 2d 43 5 ( 1996). 
Murphy v Commonwealth 896 F Supp 557 (DC Va 1995) 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [1997) AJHR E63, 12. 
59 
60 
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objective of protecting the public from unsafe or disqualified drivers .
60 Further, 
disqualification would often be imposed in the event of conviction for an offence 
arising out of conduct for which licence suspension was imposed, but the court 
retained the discretion not to impose disqualification in certain circumstances
61
. 
In assessmg the extent of the impairment on the right, the Attorney-
General was influenced by a Canadi;m decision62 which expressed concern at 
using the deterrence argument to justify the imposition of penal sanctions 
abrogating a protected right, where increasing the prospects of detection of an 
offence would act as a more effective deterrent than imposing penal sanctions. 
The report stated that in order to constitute a reasonable limit the 
sentencing Court should be given some discretion to terminate a licence 
suspension or vehicle impoundment following sentencing of a defendant.
63 
Therefore, the section 7 report concluded that clauses 56 and 57 infringed 
the rights conferred by section 26(2) of the Bill of Rights Act in a manner that 
could not be treated as a reasonable limit for the purposes of section 5 of the Bill 
of Rights Act. 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [1997] AJHR E63 , 13 . 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [1997] AJHR E63, 13. 
Land Transport Bill 1997, no 87-1 , cl 38 and 55; cited in Attorney General "Report on the Land 
TransportBilr' [1997] AJHRE.63, 13. 
Horsefie/d v Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1997) 30 OTC 138 (Ontario Court of Justice 
(General Division)). 
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2 Consideration of the Section 7 Report as the Bill Progressed 
(a) Second Reading 
The bill proceeded straight to second reading, its introduction and first 
reading omitted by virtue of Standing Order 27364 . 
At second reading65 the report was acknowledged by members, most of 
whom suggested that "[t]here is work to be done on this Bill by the select 
committee to overcome these problems".66 Other members took the attitude that 
"[t]hese tough administrative actions at the roadside ... will, I believe, meet the 
objective of improving road safety and can be justified. ,'67 
(b) Select Committee Consideration and Report 
The Bill was referred to the Transport and Environment Committee for 
consideration on 7 August 1998. 
Submissioners were divided in their support for clause 117, but the 
committee were influenced by information provided by the sponsoring 
department, the Ministry of Transport. They emphasised the need to reduce road 
trauma caused by drunk drivers from pleading technical defences. They 
submitted that if the presumption was made rebuttable, defendants would 
Attorney-General "Report on the Land Transport Bill" (1997] AJHR E63 , 13. 
Standing Order 273 allows for any bill which the House has accorded urgency, to be introduced 
and to proceed at any time but not so as to interrupt a debate (House of Representatives Standing 
Orders of the House of Representatives (Wellington, 1999), SO 273). Urgency (pursuant to the 
19% Standing Orders) was accorded the Land Transport Bill on 20 November 1997. 
(27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5747-5761. 
John Wright (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5754. 
Hon Maurice Williamson (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5747. 
68 
69 
70 
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potentially have more technical loopholes to use as defences m drinking and 
cir. · 68 1vmg cases. 
The committee was also influenced by information that provisions having 
the same effect as clause 117 have been present in New Zealand law since 1970 
(in relation to blood-alcohol levels) and 1978 (for breath-alcohol levels/
9
. 
The committee recommended that the clause proceed and the conclusive 
presumption be retained. They supported the initiative to reduce road fatalities 
and injuries caused by drunk drivers and recognised that strong enforcement 
measures may deter offenders. A primary reason for their decision to support the 
clause was a determination to prevent a legal loophole, allowing such defences as 
the "hip-flask" defence70, undermining the deterrence of drinking and driving. 
The committee's consideration of clause 56 (renamed clause 59ZJ) was 
coloured by broad support of the provision by submissioners. However, the New 
Zealand Law Society and the Legislation Advisory Committee concurred with the 
Attorney-General ' s findings that a defendant has the right not to be punished 
twice for the same offence. 
In conclusion the committee agreed that the deterrence mechanism would 
be undermined if the court were able to terminate the licence suspension. 
Clause 57 (renamed clause 59ZK) did not receive comment on the Bill of 
Rights issues identified by the Attorney-General's report . This was probably 
because the arguments accorded to clause 56 were equally applicable in the 
context of clause 57 . Overall the committee supported the clause. 
Transport and Environment Committee " Report on the Land Transport Bill" [ 1998] 
AJHR 1.23, 843. 
Culminating in section 58 of the Transport Act 1962, as amended. 
The hip-flask defence involved people claiming that they had had a quick drink to steady their 
71 
72 
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(c) Consideration of the Select Committee's report 
The Transport and Environment Committee's report was considered in the 
House in November 1998. 
There was a notable absence of debate regarding the committee' s 
consideration of the Attorney-General ' s report. There was a recognition by the 
(then) Minister of Transport that the Bill of Rights safeguards the rights of New 
Zealanders, but his emphasis was that "[t]here are situations .. where limitations 
have to be placed on those rights in the interests of the greater public good."71 He 
emphasised that while the Attorney-General felt some provisions were contrary to 
the Bill of Rights his concerns were effectively countered by the select 
committees determination that the limitation on driver 's rights is justified.72 
( d) Committee of the Whole 
The Bill was considered by the House in Committee. Two members' 
speeches mentioned the impugned clauses and their Bill of Rights concerns. Hon 
Phil Goff described it as a "debateable legal point" whether the clauses put a 
person in jeopardy of being punished twice, but dispelled it as an "academic 
debate". 73 Hon Jim Sutton described limiting protected rights as "a small price to 
pay. ,,74 
nerves after a crash or other incident, but were not in fact intoxicated at the time of the incident. 
Hon Maurice Williamson (5 November 1998) 573 NZPD 12942. 
Hon Maurice Williamson (5 November 1998) 573 NZPD 12942. 
Hon Phil Goff(24 November 1998) 573 NZPD 13540. 
Hon Jim Sutton (24 November 1998) 573 NZPD 13541 . 
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Both clauses 56 and 57 were agreed to on a vote with minor amendments 
made to each, but the amendments did not affect the Bill of Rights 
inconsistencies. 
There was no debate on clause 117. 
( e) Third Reading 
Although the Bill's safe passage by this stage was a mere formality, Owen 
Jennings raised Bill of Rights concerns again at third reading on 3 December 
1998. He recognised that "it [had] become apparent in the debate that there are 
too few members of the House who are prepared to stand up and speak on behalf 
of civil liberties."75 He stated 76 
[t]he Bill represents a worrying encroachment on the personal liberty of New Zealanders 
for what might be determined to be a dubious gain. The dearly held justice of being 
innocent until proved guilty in a court of law has once again been breached by this 
Parliament. . .. We should not let them go without a struggle. The ease with which we 
trade away these liberties for short-term questionable gains at the behest of what are often 
narrowly focused interest groups is quite alarming. 
Lianne Dalziel expressed a similar view suggesting
77 
[w]e should properly train young people how to drive well and how to take responsibility 
for their actions on the road. That would do fu.r more to improve our road safety 
objectives and to make our country a more secure place. We have given up legitimate 
rights and freedoms, and, sadly, I do not believe that we will achieve the objectives that 
this Bill states that it is there to achieve. 
Owen Jennings (3 December 1998) 574 NZPD 13822. 
Owen Jennings (3 December 1998) 574 NZPD 13822. 
Lianne Dalziel (24 November 1998) 574 NZPD 13825. 
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(f) The Act 
The Land Transport Act 1998 was passed by Parliament on 3 December 
1998. 
Clause 117 is enacted as section 77 and came into force on l March 1999. 
Clauses 56 and 57, now sections 95 and 96 respectively, came into force on 3 
May 1999. 
3 Initiatory Observations 
This case study illustrates Parliament's treatment of a section 7 report and 
their exercise of Parliamentary Sovereignty (reinforced by section 4) to legislate 
contrary to the Bill of Rights. 
1t illustrates the implementation of the vetting procedure, as outlined in 
the section 7 report. It illustrates a House leaving substantial Bill of Rights issues 
to the relevant select committee to resolve, who in turn, using section 5 
terminology but without undertaking the section 5 analysis, determine the 
provisions to be justified in light of their objective. In this way, it illustrates the 
apparent status of a section 7 report as a submission, considered amongst other 
submissions at that stage of the process. 
It illustrates a relaxed (majority) attitude to the Bill of Rights Act even 
when reminded by a minority (two-member) tag-team of the unjustified 
inconsistencies in the Bill . 
78 
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B The Bail Act 2000 
The Bail Bill was tabled in mid-1999. Amongst its objectives was the 
consolidation of "the main bail provisions [previously] scattered through several 
Acts of Parliament" and the codification of "some common law bail principles 
and elements of bail procedure."78 Further, it sought to reduce the likelihood of 
bail for repeat offenders and those who breach bail conditions, the bill 
ddr · 79 a essmg 
what consultation indicates is the prime concern with bail law and procedure; namely the 
high rate of offending while on bail. 
The Bail Act 2000 was chosen as a case study because of the reverse onus 
provisions contained in sections I O and 12, creating certain classes of defendant 
who are bailable only if they satisfy the judge that they should be. 
Reverse onus provisions are accepted as being prima facie inconsistent 
with section 25( c) of the Bill of Rights, that is, the right, once charged, to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.80 (Emphasis added). In 
the context of bail, reverse onus provisions deny the presumption in favour of 
bail, allowing the State to hold defendants81 
against their will [and deprive them] of their personal liberty despite the fact that they have 
not been tried, convicted or sentenced. 
While it was not until 1999 that this Bill and its reverse onus clauses came 
before Parliament, reverse onus bail provisions already had a place in our law. 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1, Explanatory Note, I. 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 , Explanatory Note, 1. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(c). 
Lianne Dalziel (20 August 1991) 518 NZPD 4182. 
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In 1991 a reverse onus bail provision was passed and implemented via 
amendment to the Crimes Act 1961 . What began as the Bail (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Bill became the Crimes Amendment Act (No 2) 1991 by 
Supplementary Order Paper82 which split the bill into three separate bills83 . 
Clause 19 of the Bill repealed section 318 of the Crimes Act and substituted a 
new section restricting the grant of bail to adult84 offenders, charged with or 
convicted of specified offences,85 who have one86 or more previous convictions 
for a specified offence. These offenders needed to satisfy a High Court judge87 on 
the balance of probabilities that bail should be granted. In determining the 
application the Court was to pay particular regard to protecting the public. 
It is arguable that the safe passage of this reverse onus provision had an 
impact on the enactment of the reverse onus provisions in the Bail Act 2000. As 
a result, a brief investigation of the impact of section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 
on the passage of section 318 of the Crimes Act, as amended, will be used to put 
the later Bail Act and section 7 vet in its proper legislative context. 
Bail (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 1991, no 12-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 57, 10 
October 1991). 
Those bills became the Summary Proceedings Amendment Act (No 2) 1991 , the Crimes 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1991 and the District Courts Amendment Act (No 2) 1991 . 
Persons 1 7 years and over. 
Specified offences are listed in the Crimes Act I %1 and include murder, manslaughter, sexual 
violation and aggravated robbery. 
The measure as introduced applied the provision to anyone with two or more convictions for 
serious crimes. The Justice and Law Reform Committee amended the clause (in response to a 
directive by the then Minister of Police, Hon John BanJcs after submissions were heard) to apply 
were a defendant has one or more convictions for serious crimes. This amendment was enacted in 
section 318. 
The clause also implements a change in jurisdiction for serious offenders requiring their bail 
applications to be heard by a High Court judge only rather than a District Court judge as was the 
case previously. 
88 
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1 The Bail (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 1991 
The Bail (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 88, (the 1991 bail bill), was 
introduced a matter of months following the coming into force of the Bill of 
Rights Act. Therefore, the progress of the bill should be read in light of possible 
teething problems in the early stages of the implementation of section 7 vetting 
procedures, which were alluded to by the, then, Minister of Justice during debate 
on the 1991 bail bill . He indicated that "some parts of the procedure that relate to 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights clearances need review ... " .89 
A section 7 report was not tabled in the House by the (then) Attomey-
General, Hon Paul East, which seems to indicate that, on advice from the CLO 
(because the MoJ were the sponsoring department), clause 19 was considered to 
be either consistent or justifiably inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
However, in the second reading debate Rt Hon David Lange suggested the 
advice tendered identified inconsistencies in the Bill stating90 
[t]he Solicitor-General's conclusion on the Bill that he examined in December 1990 was 
that the Bill ought to be the subject of a report to the House by the Attorney-General 
because on the evidence tendered to him he did not consider that there could be a case 
made out for its not being in conflict. 
Therefore, a section 7 report may not have been presented because the 
Attorney-General did not accept the tendered advice. 
The tendered advice, being the subject of legal professional privilege, can 
only be released with the consent of the Attorney-General . The Attorney-General 
refused to release the advice received on the Bail (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill. 
Bail (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 1991 , no 12-1 . 
Hon D A M Graham ( 15 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4868. 
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Interestingly, the Attorney-General personally endorsed the clause during 
debate in the House and voted for its enactment. He stated91 
[m]any New Zealanders are concerned that people charged with very serious offences are 
wandering the streets and committing more offences while awaiting a hearing on the 
earlier offences. In years gone by it was almost unheard of for somebody charged with 
murder to be granted bail. I can remember in the late 1960' s one case when bail was 
granted and it was virtually unheard of. Now it is becoming more and more common. 
The Government is sending a message to the judiciary through the Bill. Parliament should 
support it. 
The select committee, in considering the Bill, asked for advice from the 
sponsoring department, the MoJ, whose response to the committee contained one 
line on the reverse onus issue, stating92 
a reverse onus provision, such as contained in the Bill as introduced would comply with 
the principle set out in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
In it's submission the New Zealand Law Society only tentatively 
supported the clause as it stood, applying to a defendant who had two or more 
previous convictions. Their position may have changed after the amendment 
made by the Select Committee as a result of a directive by the then Minister of 
Police, Hon John Banks. This amendment was made following the hearing of 
submissions, but may have had a significant impact on consistency issues. 
There was inadequate infonnation provided to the House to debate the 
proposals in light of the Bill of Rights issues. This is evidenced by the speeches 
during second reading debate. 
Rt Hon David Lange (9 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4787. 
Hon Paul East (20 August 1991) 518 NZPD 4189. 
Cited by Lianne Dalziel (15 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4869. 
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Lianne Dalziel stated 93 
I have attempted to get copies of the advice received on this matter from the Solicitor-
General and the Department of Justice .. .. [At select committee] we were informed that 
there was no inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and I accepted that 
advice at race value. However, in considering the matter further, I did not realise that the 
advice did not disclose the basis on which that advice was given, and that is why I have 
sought the information from the Minister. The Minister has sent me two pieces of 
information, and he has declined me access to three more that he says are still under 
consideration. I suppose that without the other three reports, or at least those reports - I 
am not sure whether there are only three more reports to come or whether there are more 
- it is very difficult to assert that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act has indeed been 
complied with. In my opinion the Bill infringes against section 24 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act, and there ought to be a report to the House that this is so. 
The legal privilege which attaches to vetting material impedes section 7 
effecting its purpose. All information should be available to members to ensure 
constructive debate on Bill of Rights ' issues. 
While section 7 was inadequate in this instance to safeguard a protected 
right from being, arguably unjustifiably, limited, its deficiencies may only reflect 
teething problems in its early development. Whatever the cause, and despite 
continued concern from members regarding the constitutionality of the reverse 
onus provision94 clause 19 was enacted and remained in force until its repeal 
pursuant to the Bail Act 2000, on 1 January 2001. 
Lianne Dalziel (9 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4 781 . 
Most notably by Rt Hon David Lange (9 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4787, Lianne Dalziel (20 
August 1991) 518 NZPD 4182; (9 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4781 ; (15 October 1991) 519 NZPD 
95 
96 
97 
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2 The Bail Bill 1999 
(a) Section 7 vet and Introduction to the House 
The 1999 Bail Bill's objectives included improving the quality of 
information available to judges at bail hearings, and making it harder for three 
classes of defendants to obtain bail before the determination of their charge. The 
latter objective was achieved by extending the reverse onus provision, introduced 
by the Crimes Amendment (No 2) Act 1991 (discussed above), to include 
defendants who, having previously received a custodial sentence95, commits a 
Crimes Act offence carrying a maximum sentence of three of more years 
imprisonment while on bail or at large 96 for committing a similar offence97 . 
The reverse onus provisions in the Bill are prima facie inconsistent with 
section 25( c) of the Bill of Rights which protects the fundamental tenet of the 
criminal justice system, that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
As the MoJ was the sponsonng department, the section 7 vetting 
procedure was undertaken by the Crown Law Office (CLO). No section 7 report 
was tabled in the House by the Attorney-General after receiving advice from 
CLO, containing a one line assurance that "the particular reverse onus provisions 
[were] justified in terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights"
98
. 
4869 and Hon Richard Prebble (20 August 1991) NZPD 4184. 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 , cl lO(c). 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 , cl JO(b). 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 , cl IO(a). . 
Michael Hodgen and Andrew Butler (Crown Counsel) "The Bail Bill 1999" (Advice to Attomey-
GeneraL 28 May 1999). (Privilege waived and released on request) 
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(b) Second reading 
At second reading, the (then) Minister of Justice, Hon Tony Ryall, began 
the debate by stating99 
... we have retained the Crimes Act provision that reverse the onus for serious violent 
offenders .... We have added an extra offence to the list of seiious vile offences that 
trigger reverse onus ... We want to extend this reverse onus further to serious offences 
not involving violence, committed while on bail. 
The debate proceeded on the understanding that the Bill was consistent 
with the Bill of Rights Act. However, it is evident from Hansard that members 
were aware of the Bill of Rights tight-rope they were walking. This is illustrated 
through repeated justification of the reverse onus provision; not to exculpate the 
House for breaching a fundamental right, but to substantiate the provision's 
consistency with the Bill of Rights; a subtle, but significant, difference. 
Hon Phil Goff stated100 
[i]t makes a mockery of our justice system if we do not have a system that at least puts the 
rights of the community to be safe from the predations of hard-core recidivists on a par 
with the rights of the offender to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty. That is an 
important principle, but that principle has to become qualified when a person, by a track 
record of offending and offending on bail is likely to continue to offend. 
Hon Tony Ryal1 (Minister of Justice) ( I June 1999) 578 NZPD 17240. 
Hon Phil Goff (1 June 1999) 578 NZPD I 7242. 
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and Patricia Schnauer stated101 
[w]hile we must adhere to the presumption of innocence, none the less that presumption 
has to be weighed against the rights of the community to be protected. There will always 
be that balancing of factors; the balancing of the different views. 
( c) Select Committee consideration 
The Bill was then referred to Select Committee for consideration. The 
Select Committee briefly considered the consistency of reverse onus provisions 
with the Bill of Rights generally and concluded 102 
[w]e note the concerns expressed regarding reversed onus provisions, but continue to 
believe that, when appropriately targeted, they are a justifiable means of addressing 
offending on bail. 
Some substantial amendments, which did not directly affect Bill of Rights 
issues, were made at this stage ,103 but the report contained a recommendation, 
which remained extrinsic to the Bill awaiting advice from the MoJ, which would 
affect consistency with the Bill of Rights. 
Their recommendation broadened the pool of defendants caught by the 
reverse onus provision, ensuring recidivist property offenders were caught. The 
MoJ tendered advice to the Select Committee outlining why they did not support 
widening the net to catch property offenders. 
Patricia Schnauer ( 1 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17244. 
Justice and Law Reform Committee "Report on the Bail Bill" [1999] AJHR I. A8, vi. 
For example, a standard of proof was added to the reverse onus provision (the balance of 
104 
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( d) Advice received from the MoJ 
The MoJ determined
104 that the recommended amendment was contrary to 
section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 which requires the detention of 
property offenders only in special circumstances.105 This section is reinforced by 
section 7 of the Criminal Justice Act which provides that the Court keep 
offenders in the community "so far as that is practicable and consonant with 
promoting the safety of the community". This is subject to section 5 of that Act 
which provides that relatively serious violence should be punished by 
imprisonment. 
The MoJ felt that as a result of these provisions, hard-core property 
offenders would receive a custodial remand and sentence without reversing the 
onus of proof in bail hearings. 
Further, the Ministry felt the determination of bail on the basis of past 
convictions was "probably ... in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990."106 While they acknowledged that it was not, as a result, unlawful they 
suggested that it was a "good indication that the proposed law is contrary to one 
of the fundamental principles upon which our democratic nation is founded". 107 
probabilities) . 
Mandy McDonald, Deputy Secretary for Justice, (Criminal Justice) "Consideration 
of the Bail Bill and the Crimes (Bail Reform) Bill Restricting Bail for Hard Core Recidivist 
(Property) Offenders and Other Matters" (To Justice and Law Refonn Select Committee, 
16 August 1999) 2-3 . (Released following request pursuant to Official Information Act.) 
Generally, where any other sentence would be inadequate or inappropriate. 
Mandy McDonald, Deputy Secretary for Justice (Criminal Justice) "Consideration 
of the Bail Bill and the Crimes (Bail Refonn) Bill. Restricting Bail for Hard Core Recidivist 
(Property) Offenders and Other Matters" (To Justice and Law Refonn Select Committee, 
16 August 1999) 4.(Released following request pursuant to Official Information Act 1982). 
Mandy McDonald, Deputy Secretary for Justice (Criminal Justice) "Consideration 
of the Bail Bill and the Crimes (Bail Reform) Bill. Restricting Bail for Hard Core Recidivist 
(Property) Offenders and Other Matters" (To Justice and Law Refonn Select Committee, 
16 August 1999) 4. (Released following request pursuant to Official Information Act 1982). 
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( e) Consideration of Select Committee report by the House 
Despite the advice received from the MoJ, the extension of the reverse 
onus provision to include property offenders was described by the (then) 
Attorney-General, Rt Hon Sir Douglas Graham, in debate as 108 
[ adding] emphasis to the general restriction on bail that the clause as introduced provided . 
. . and the Government supports it. 
The Attorney-General referred in his speech to the section 7 vet by the 
CLO. He re-stated its resulting consistency with the Bill of Rights Act on the 
premise that it "narrowly targeted a group for which there was just cause to refuse 
bail",109 and re-stated the provision ' s objective as targeting "serious recidivist 
offenders no matter what the nature of their alleged offending". 110 As a natural 
progression from these statements he concluded that the inclusion of property 
offenders in the reverse onus provision did not broaden the provision as it was 
first introduced and vetted by the CLO, but merely clarified its scope. Thus, what 
was once consistent was still consistent. 
Patricia Schnauer shed light on the kamikaze-like attitude of the Select 
Committee toward the Bill of Rights when she said 
111 
. . . some members of the committee did feel that if it breached the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act in some way, then perhaps that Act itself needed amending .... 
Consideration of the Select Committee' s report was interrupted for what 
became a period of five months. During that time Hon Phil Goff introduced a 
Supplementary Order Paper. 
Rt Hon Sir Douglas Graham (31 August 1999) 580 NZPD 18928. 
Rt Hon Sir Douglas Graham (31 August 1999) 580 NZPD 18927. 
Rt Hon Sir Douglas Graham (31 August 1999) 580 NZPD 18927. 
Patricia Schnauer (31 August 1999) 580 NZPD 18930. 
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(f) Supplementary Order Paper (No 220) 1999 
Alongside a clause reiterating the Select Committee' s amendment 
requiring a Judge's satisfaction that a serious property offence would not be 
committed while on bail, was the adoption of the Select Committee ' s 
recommendation (contrary to MoJ advice) to broaden the pool of defendants 
caught by the reverse onus provision, on the basis of previous criminal history. 
It proposed the implementation of a reverse onus clause targeted at 
offenders charged with a Crimes Act offence carrying a maximum sentence of 3 
or more years imprisonment, with at least 10 previous convictions for offences 
carrying the same penalty as the offence charged, who has breached bail or 
offended on bail at least once previously.112 
This amendment was introduced immediately prior to a general election 
which resulted in a change of government and interrupted the Bill ' s progress. 
(g) Committee of the Whole House and Supplementary Order Paper 
(No 26) 2000 
When the House returned following the election and a change in 
government, consideration of the Select Committee report continued, culminating 
in referral to debate by Committee of the Whole House. 
Debate centred around a proposed amendment, introduced by 
Supplementary Order Paper' 13 agam sponsored by Hon Phil Goff, who had 
become Minister of Justice. 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 220,2 September 1999). 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 26, 30 May 2000). 
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The amendment lowered the trigger-threshold of the reverse onus 
provis10n from 10 previous convictions to 14 previous custodial sentences. 
However, there was no requirement to have previously breached, or offended 
h ·1 b ·1 114 w 1 e on, ai. 
During debate, the Bill of Rights was contemplated and minimalised by 
the sponsoring member in the same breath. While acknowledging the need to 
take the Bill of Rights Act "into account"11 5, he expressly reminded the House of 
their capability to legislate contrary to the Bill of Rights Act and of the most 
recent example of the House exercising this capability.11 6 
He opined the provision to be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act 
because preventing re-offending on bail is "just cause" for a custodial remand, for 
the purposes of section 24 of that Act. In doing so he purposively or inadvertently 
(and publicly) ignores the implications of the provision on the right to a 
presumption of innocence. 
There was concern expressed by some members that the provision was 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Tony Ryall queried accepting such an 
amendment without outside advice from the MoJ. In answer Mr Goff stated 11 7 
I want to advise the member that the advice given to me by the Ministry of Justice is 
supportive of the amendment moved. I want to advise him that the Crown Law Office 
opinion, which I can make available to him, indicates that this is not a breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
The above advice was not made available to Opposition parties when it 
d e. th Mi . 11 8 was requeste 1rom e mster. 
Bail Bill 1999, no 300-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 26, 30 May 2000), cl IO(l)(b). 
Hon Phil Goff(24 February 2000) 581 NZPD 789. 
This example was the Land Transport legislation discussed above. 
Hon Phil Goff(30 May 2000) 584 NZPD 2634. 
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Further, Tony Ryall quoted comments made by Mr Goff which allude to 
his arguably relaxed view of the Bill of Rights. Regarding the earlier ' ten 
previous convictions' amendment, he stated 11 9 
[w]hen I talked bout the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act being a problem he said "Some 
say the threshold is too high. Interestingly the Attorney-General says there may be conflict 
with the Bill of Rights ... " Mr Goff said of the then Attorney-General: "I suggest that he 
will have little support for his position. . . . He ignored the advice and continued to 
platform up and down the country ... 
The Bill proceeded with a Green-initiated amendment which lowered the 
trigger-threshold further, in light of the objective of the Bill, requiring a history of 
breaching, or offending whilst on, bail. 
(h) Third reading 
Hon Phil Goff opened debate and discussed the impugned clause as 
amended in Committee. In relation to Bill of Rights consistency, rather than 
assessing the consistency of the provision itself, the Minister of Justice alluded to 
its consistency in terms of previous inconsistencies, 'creating' consistency by 
. 1· . H d1 20 imp 1cat10n. e state 
[t]he change does not go as far as the Supplementary Order Paper that I proposed last 
year, that would have set a lower threshold for the reversed onus measure. I have been 
advised that the earlier proposal was too wide sweeping, and consequently breached the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. ... The threshold, as it has now been targeted, does not 
breach the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act but it will still put away 2,000 more hard-core 
offenders each year. 
Tony Ryall (30 May 2000) 584 NZPD 2660. It was stated "We wrote several weeks ago for [the 
advice]. He denied the information. He continues to defly it. " 
Tony Ryall (30 May 2000) 584 NZPD 2651-2652. 
Hon Phil Goff(4 October 2000) 587 NZPD 5904. 
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Debate evidences an arguably misplaced focus of the debate on the 
public's "very clear message to this Parliament, .. that they want this Parliament 
to recognise the seriousness of crime". 121 Despite this message, the government 
had "tossed out with scorn"
122 the Truth in Sentencing Bill, and seemed to 
compensate failed policy by imposing harsh reverse onus provisions on repeat 
offenders. 
The impugned provision, as amended by the House in Committee, was 
enacted and came into force on 1 January 2001 as section 12 of the Bail Act 2000. 
3 Initiatory Observations 
This Bail (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill case study illustrates the 
Attorney-General's residual discretion to reject the advice tendered by the vetting 
agency. It illustrates the lack of transparency in the process; the advice tendered 
to the Attorney-General by CLO being protected by legal professional privilege 
for the Attorney-General to waive at his or her discretion. It illustrates the 
Attorney-General's ability to go beyond excusing a provision and extend to 
endorsing it in debate in the House, which can imply consistency and therefore 
mislead members. It also illustrates flaws in the timing of the vet, where 
consistency-issues can arise from amendment at the select committee stage after 
the hearing of public submissions. It illustrates that this problem arose even 
before the reorganisation of the legislative process as implemented by the 1999 
Standing Orders. 123 
Janet Mackey ( 4 October 2000) 587 NZPD 5908. 
Stephen Franks (4 October 2000) 587 NZPD 5908. 
House of Representatives Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (WeUington, 8 
September 1999). 
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The 1999 Bail Bill case study illustrates the subjectivity of the 
Moonen/vetting process. It illustrates the brevity of advice sometimes tendered 
by the vetting agency, which must be detrimental to an objective assessment of 
the advice by the Attorney-General when determining whether to accept or reject 
it. It illustrates how rights can be slowly eroded, by using an earlier-enacted 
breaching provision to justify later, more extensive, breaching provisions. 
It illustrates how extensive select committee amendments can be, how a 
section 5 analysis of amendments is absent from deliberations, and, more 
positively, how further advice regarding Bill of Rights ' implications can be 
sought from the bill's sponsoring agency. However, it also illustrates how this 
advice can be overshadowed by the will of the sponsoring member. 
It illustrates how often a single provision can be amended throughout the 
legislative process, particularly by Supplementary Order Paper. It illustrates how 
advice can be withheld from Opposition parties requiring members to accept 
assurances from the sponsoring member. It illustrates how the focus of debate 
can be misplaced and overshadow issues regarding Bill of Rights consistency. 
C The Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No 2) 1999 
This amendment of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 was introduced as the 
Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 6), a companion measure to the Crimes 
(Home Invasion) Amendment Bill . 
Its purpose was to lower the threshold for imposing non-parole periods 
enabling courts to impose them in a wider range of cases than was being 
exercised, and included, but was not limited to, murder cases involving home 
· · 124 mvas10n. 
Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 6) 1999, no 261-1 (Explanatory Note), I. 
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1 The impugned clause 
Clause 2 implemented the policy outlined above and the CLO vet 
identified no inconsistencies with the Bill of Rights, as the legislation was not 
retrospective when the amendment was introduced by the Government. The Bill 
was referred to the Justice and Law Reform Committee at its second reading, and 
it was duly considered. 
It was reported back to the House with amendments and debated clause by 
clause in Committee. Two Supplementary Order Papers were introduced at this 
stage, one by Hon Phil Goff 125, the other by Patricia Schnauer126. 
The former was negatived on 24 June 1999. 
The latter Supplementary Order Paper introduced clause 2(4) which 
stated127 
( 4) Section 80 of the principal Act (as amended by this section) applies in respect of the 
making of any order under that section on or after the date of commencement of this 
section, even if the offence concerned was committed before that date. (Emphasis 
added). 
This clause, introduced at the eleventh hour, was debated by the House, In 
Com.mi ttee. 
Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 6) 1999, no 261-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 182, 
23 June 1999). 
Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 6) 1999, no 261-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 185, 
23 June 1999). 
Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 6) 1999, no 261-1 (Supplementary Order Paper No 185, 
23 June 1999) cl 2(4). 
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Concerns regarding a potential anomaly were heavily debated. The fact 
that the clause could result in a harsher penalty for a murder occurring inside a 
house than one committed in the front garden of the same house overshadowed 
what has since been identified by the Courts128 as a blatant inconsistency with the 
Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was not mentioned in debate between members. 
2 Consideration of the clause in light of the Bill of Rights 
Section 25(g) of the Bill of Rights Act states 129 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of the 
charge .. [t]he right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been 
varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser 
penalty. 
Patricia Schnauer referred to the clause's retrospective effect, but not in 
light of the Bill of Rights, and from a position of advocate. She stated 130 
I would also like to draw the House's attention to the impact that this will have because, 
of course, once this Bill becomes law .. then the impact of that provision will affect those 
who are now before the couns on murder charges in the context of home invasion. 
As recognised by Thomas J these comments are indicative that 131 
[w]hile no individual or individuals are named, section 2(4) [is] expressly aimed at accused 
persons already facing charges of murder. Widespread media publicity relating to crimes 
in the home had been given to certain cases, and the persons who the provision [is] aimed 
at [are] readily ascertainable. 
By the Court of Appeal in two cases arising from the implications of the provision, R v Poumako 
[2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA) and R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA). 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s25(g). · 
Patricia Schnauer (24 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17687. 
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He was referring specifically to a defendant charged and later convicted with the 
home invasion murder of Beverley Bouma which outraged the nation and 
provided the catalyst for this, and its companion home invasion, bill. 
Clause 2(4) progressed to third reading without amendment and was 
enacted as section 2(4) of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1999. 
Because the clause was introduced after the section 7 vet there was no 
official report to the House identifying its inconsistency with the Bill of Rights 
Act. However, "the unconstitutionality of the provision and its departure from the 
rule of law [is] clear". 132 
3 Initiatory Observations 
This case study illustrates issues associated with the timing of the vet. It 
provides an example of how late an amendment can be introduced in the 
legislative process which can impact on a bill's consistency with the Bill of 
Rights Act. It also illustrates that no other agency is plugging the gap to prevent 
eleventh-hour inconsistencies from being enacted. An implication of this flaw, 
also illustrated by this case study, is the role of the judiciary as a constitutional 
safeguard after inconsistent provisions are enacted. 
Further, debate of the Supplementary Order Paper in the House illustrates 
not only the members' disregard of the Bill of Rights when faced with an emotive 
public, but, more disturbingly, their apparent lack of knowledge of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Act and a lack of understanding of the impact of 
legislative provisions on ratified international treaties, existing domestic 
legislation, common law rules and, ultimately, the rule of law itself. 
R v Poumako above, 713 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
R v Poumako above, 713 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. The Court of Appeal were 
unanimously of this view. 
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V SECTION 7 - ORANGE CONE OR ARMED DEFENDERS SQUAD? 
The case studies provide a restricted but useful platform from which 
section 7 can be assessed in light of its nature and scope, and its constitutional 
status. They illustrate a number of sub-issues which can be categorised within 
two broader issues; timing and transparency. 
A Timing of the Vetting Process 
As section 7 stands, a bill ' s is assessed for consistency with the Bill of 
Rights at a single point in its legislative process. The type of bill determines 
when that vet takes place, 133 but irrespective of type one vet is undertaken and 
consistency is assessed prior to debate and consideration, and inevitable 
subsequent amendment, by the House and relevant Select Committee. This, and 
associated issues, question how convincing section 7 is as a generator of 
constructive debate and constitutional safeguard of our recognised rights. 
1 Status of the section 7 report to the House 
The section 7 vet for consistency occurs at the beginning of a bill ' s 
legislative process and, more importantly, prior to select committee 
consideration. As a result of this timing, the House appears unashamedly reliant 
on the relevant select committee to rectify consistency issues either by 
amendment or by re- assessment of the reasonableness of the inconsistency. This 
is illustrated by the Land Transport case study. 
A Government bill is vetted on the introduction of that bill, (section 7(a), Bill of Rights Act 
1990). Any other bill is vetted as soon as practicable after the introduction of that bill, (Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, section 7(b)). 
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At second reading the House expressly transferred the implications of the 
section 7 report to the Transport and Environment committee to resolve. In light 
of the section 7 report, Hon Maurice Williamson stated " [t]he Transport and 
Environment Committee will need to consider the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act implications of these provisions", 134 and John Wright, regarding 
acknowledged inconsistencies, stated "[t]here is work to be done on this Bill by 
the select committee to overcome those problems". 135 
Interestingly, the select committee "process" of resolution did not involve 
an independent vet using the Moonen analysis. Despite its outcome being 
couched in Moonen terms (that is, that the provisions contain 'justified' 
inconsistencies) its value was decided using the same procedures as the value-
determination of other select committeee submissions. 
In its report to the House, the Transport and Environment Committee 
acknowledged, in light of the section 7 report, that 
136 
this bill does contain provisions which could have implications in terms of the limitations 
of personal freedoms ... (Emphasis added.) 
Specifically, regarding clauses 56 and 57, they concluded
137 
[t]he fact that the sentencing court would not have power to terminate the licence 
suspension, upon sentencing of the defendant, was integral to the Attorney-General's 
finding. The New Zealand Law Society and the Legislation Advisory Committee also 
pointed to the right not to be punished twice for the same offence. However, we concur 
with the view of officials that the deterrence mechanism . . . would be undermined if the 
court were able to terminate the licence suspension. 
Hon Maurice Williamson (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5748. 
John Wright (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5754. 
Transport and Environment Committee "Report on the Land Transport BiJI" [1998] AJHR I.23, 
843, 854. . 
Transport and Environment Committee "Report on the Land Transport Bill" [1998] AJHR 1.23, 
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Following the Select Committee's recommendation that the section 7 
report be ignored, debate on the inconsistency issue was limited to one member. 
Hon Maurice Williamson stated138 
[t]he New Zealand Bill of Rights Act safeguards the rights of New Zealanders. There are 
situations, however, where limitations have to be placed on those rights in the interests of 
the greater public good. 
The select committee recommendation to pursue the inconsistent 
provisions was upheld in the House and they were enacted. 
This approach, combined with factors previously outlined such as section 
7's status alongside section 4
139 and the non-binding nature of a section 7 
report 140, arguably relegates a section 7 report to the status of a select committee 
submission; hardly the status envisaged by the drafters of the provision and the 
status accorded its Canadian equivalent. 
2 The potential for amendment following the section 7 vet 
(a) Amendment at Select Committee 
An obvious flaw in the section 7 process results from the requirement that 
the single vet for consistency with the Bill of Rights Act is undertaken prior to 
select committee perusal and amendment. 
While Standing Order 282 requires that select committee amendments be 
relevant to the subject matter and consistent with the principles and objects of the 
843, 853 . 
Hon Maurice Williamson ( 5 November 1998) 572 NZPO 12942. 
See Part II.D of this paper. 
See Part 11.D of this paper. 
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bill, there will often be more than drafting changes. Frequently there are changes 
made to a bill's substance and policy; in fact, "[i]t is not unknown for bills to 
emerge from select committees almost totally rewritten."141 The Bill of Rights 
itself is an example of a bill which underwent substantial amendment during its 
legislative process. 
A potentially significant change was made to the 1991 bail bill at the 
Select Committee stage, changing the trigger for the reverse onus provision from 
defendants with two previous convictions to defendants with only one prior 
conviction. This amendment was purportedly made at the directive of then 
Minister of Police, Hon John Banks which illustrates the potential for abuse of 
the current system. That is, a Minister, or party, can avoid a damning section 7 
report being tabled in the House, and stem criticism from interested parties, by 
recommending or introducing amendment following the hearing of select 
committee submissions. 
(b) Amendment In Committee 
The above is true if the bill is subjected to the scrutiny of Committee of 
the Whole House. Further, inconsistent amendments, introduced post-section 7 
vetting, can only be more likely now, in an MMP environment. The 1999 bail bill 
illustrates a substantial change made at the initiative of a Green party member at 
this stage in the bill's legislative process
142
. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Dr Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government Under 
MMP (3 ed, Oxford University Press New Zealand, Auckland, 1997) 161 . 
The requirement that a defendant have previously breached, or offended while on, bail (Bail Act 
2000, section 12( 1 )(b )(iii)). 
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( c) Supplementary Order Papers 
Inconsistent provisions can be added by Supplementary Order Paper at 
any stage during a bill's legislative process following introduction and, therefore, 
vetting. The 1999 bail bill case study provides an illustration of numerous 
amendments introduced by Supplementary Order Paper throughout its process. 
The extent of this flaw is evidenced by the amendment to the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act, introduced by Supplementary Order Paper, which resulted in the 
enactment of a retrospective penalty provision. 
( d) A change in Government 
Some bills, by chance or due to delays in their legislative progress, span a 
general election. The 1999 bail bill is an example of a bill surviving a change of 
government. However, it also illustrates the volume of amendments which can 
result. In that case study the majority of the House was in favour of the 
legislation so amendment was not as substantial as it would be when the major 
parties commit to significantly different policy. 
A bill could arguably benefit from a change in government, and resulting 
new Attorney-General, during its legislative process, as the consistency-status of a 
bill may change, for better or worse, if the new Attorney-General 's views differ 
significantly from the incumbent's. This is due to the arguably subjective nature 
of the test. 143 However, because section 7 (and Standing Order 260
144
) requires 
only a single vet at the introduction of a bill, there is no obligation for the new 
Attorney-General to re-assess the initial vet, or request or undertake another vet of 
the bill as introduced. 
Discussed in detail in Part V.B.1 of this paper. 
Standing Order 260 of the 1999 Standing Orders requires the Attorney-General to provide a 
written indication to the House of Representatives, before second reading, if a bill is inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights Act. This obligation is not treated as a separate requirement from section 
LAW llBRA8Y 
VICTORIA UNIVERSIW Of- WELLl1~GTON 
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3 Plugging the Section 7 Gap 
(a) Parliamentary Counsel Office 
The main function of the Parliamentary Counsel Office (PCO) is the 
drafting of legislation. This includes the drafting of Bills and amendments to 
those bills before Select Committees and during the Committee stages in the 
House (in the form of Supplementary Order Papers) . As all legislation must 
comply with the Legislation Advisory Committee ' s guidelines, amendments must 
be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act. 145 
When asked if PCO considers vetting amendments for consistency, (that 
1s, plugging the section 7 gap), as part of their role, George Tanner, Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel , replied "of course", but acknowledged that there were no 
specific systems in place to do so. However, when asked about the enactment of 
the retrospective penalty provisions outlined in the Criminal Justice Amendment 
case study, he uttered "no comment", but was prepared to say "advice was 
146 
proffered". 
7 as is discussed in more detail in Part II.F of this paper. 
L!gislation Advisory Committee Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines: Guidelines on 
Process and Content of Legislation (2001 edition) (Wellington, 2001) <http://www.justice.govt. 
nzJlac/index.html>(last accessed 26 September 2001), Chapter 4.1. 
Discussion with George Tanner, Chief Parliamentary Counsel (the author, Wellington, 12 
September 2001). 
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(b) Section 6 
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act states1·P 
Wherever an enactmem can be gIVen a mearung that IS cons1Stent \lo-Uh the nghts and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that mearung shall be preferred to any other 
mearung. 
That is, the judiciary are to interpret prima facie and justified inconsistent 
legislation in a way that prevents inconsistency. 
Toe approach to section 6, adopted by the majority in R v Pora (a case 
which arose from the retrospective penalty provision in the Criminal Justice 
Amendment case study), is illustrative of successful judicial gap-plugging. 
As a result of the extent of the inconsistency, with not only the Bill of 
Rights but also with instruments of international law, common law and the rule of 
law doctrine, the majority of the Court of Appeal imported an, arguably, 
"strained" meaning to the provision so as to give effect to section 6, rather than be 
overridden by section 4 of the Bill of Rights . Elias CJ implied that the Court 
would be in breach of section 3 if they did not adopt that approach, because
14 
[t]he ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act applies to aets done in performance of public 
functiof!S and to the acts of the legislature and rhe jud1aary (s3) If Parliament has 
enacted legislation which rrnposes a penalty retrospectively, it is in breach of the obligat.Jon 
recognised bys 3 ... (EmphaslS added.) 
Therefore, instead of giving full retrospective effect to the provision and 
breaching section 3, the Court limited its retrospective effect, which on its face is 
ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. 
R v Pora above, 47 (CA). See generally Andrew S Butler 'The ew Zealand Bill of 
Rights and Private Common Law L1t1gat1on" [I 991] Z1J 261 . 
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"tenable". However, in effecting their approach, they strained the meaning of the 
provision so that retrospectivity applied only to the fifteen days between 
enactment of the Crimes (Home Invasion) Act and the Criminal Justice 
Amendment legislation in question. This was clearly not intended by Parliament. 
The success of their gap-plugging is indicated in comments by Keith J in 
R v Pora. He stated 149 
The Solicitor-General was able to indicate to this Court that the government was aware of 
that strong criticism. The government was actively considering the position in terms of 
principle and appropriate remedy and it was doing that independently of a concurrent 
broader review of the legislation governing sentencing which was under way. Such an 
exchange between the Court and the government, with the prospect of legislation being 
indicated, seems to us to conform with the relationship reflected in and to some extent 
regulated by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
This illustrates the judiciary's approach to a provision which is 
abhorrently repugnant to fundamental legal principles, and one which was 
enacted as a result of inadequacies in the section 7 process. Gault J stated 
150 
[b ]ecause of the stage at which the amendments were introduced in the Bill these 
amendments were not the subject of any report to the House under section 7 of the Bill of 
Rights Act ... 
However, in reality an assertive approach is probably restricted to 
similarly abhorrent provisions, as the judiciary appear markedly more cautious 
when applying section 6 to (borderline) inconsistent provisions. 
In Ministry of Transport v Noori 151 Cooke P said that a "strained meaning 
would not be enough". 152 Tipping J, in Quilter v Attorney-General, stated
153 
R v Pora above, 53 (CA) Keith J. 
R v Poumako above, 700 (CA) Gault J. 
I 51 
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[ o ]nly if such meaning can properly be given may it be preferred to any other meaning. By 
properly I mean by a legitimate process of construction. 
Further, Thomas J stated154 
[s]ection 6 does not authorise the courts to legislate. Even if a meaning is theoretically 
possible it must be rejected if it is clearly contrary to what Parliament intended. 
In the context of the Criminal Justice Amendment case study, Thomas J stated
155 
[t]o attribute a statutory provision which is neither equivocal nor malleable in its terms a 
meaning which is admittedly contrary to Parliament's discernible intent is to effectively 
challenge Parliament's primacy. . .. If the Court proclaims a statute to mean something 
that does not meet [the] threshold requirement [that only tenable interpretations should be 
proffered], then, even though that meaning may be more consistent with the Bill of Rights, 
the Court will be seen to have acted arbitrarily. The construction will be seen to be unduly 
strained and the credibility of the judicial system will be impaired. 
Therefore, the judiciary could not arguably be relied on to plug the timing 
gap in all circumstances, although section 6 is arguably an adequate safeguard for 
dealing with the enactment of abhorrent inconsistencies. 
On-going monitoring of bills for consistency with the Bill of 
Rights 
Undertaking a vet at the beginning of a bill's legislative life would not be 
problematic, in fact would remain desirable, if there were a system of on-going 
monitoring in place, to implement continual checks for consistency as 
Ministryq/Transport vNoort [1992) 3 NZLR260 (CA). 
Ministry q/Transport v Noort above, 272 (CA) Cooke P. 
Quilter v Attorney-General (1996) 3 HRNZ 170, 232 (CA) Tipping J. 
Quilter v Attorney-General above, 193 (CA) Thomas J. 
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amendments are introduced. On-going monitoring of bills throughout their 
legislative process appears not only preferable, but was arguably envisaged as part 
of the implementation of section 7. 
(a) A purposive interpretation of section 7 
As mentioned earlier, 156 section 7 is capable of a broader meaning than 
that attached to it by the vetting agencies. A purposive interpretation (in line with 
accepted human rights jurisprudence157) , would require " section 7 procedures to 
extend beyond pre-introduction" 158 to prevent "both intentional and inadvertent 
inconsistencies to progress unchecked."159 
(b) Intent of drafters 
Ongoing monitoring was arguably envisaged by Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee who considered the Bill of Rights White Paper. They 
recommended a cautious approach, proposing the introduction of the Bill as an 
ordinary statute and opposing a supreme, entrenched bill of rights. As a corollary 
to that recommendation they proposed a number of administrative safeguards 
intended to protect the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill from 
Parliamentary derogation . 
One of the proposed safeguards was for the "operation of the bill of rights 
b · d b l . " 
16° Furth th t l t ·tt to e momtore y a se ect committee . er, a se ec comm1 ee was 
intended to 
16 1 
R v Poumako above, 714 (CA) Thomas J dissenting. 
In Part II.E of this paper. 
See note 12. 
Fitzgerald, above, 153. 
Fitzgerald, above, 154 
Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand" [1987-1990] XVII AJHRI.8C, 3. 
Justice and Law Reform Committee ''Final Report on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New 
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take similar action [to the Attorney-General's section 7 process] and report to the House 
on any provisions in any bill that appeared contrary to the principles and specific articles in 
the Bill of Rights. 
Arguably, it was envisaged that there would be a separate, specialised Bill 
of Rights select committee who monitored amendments for consistency. This 
view is reinforced in the report, where it states 162 
. . . all bills and regulations could stand referred to the committee which would be 
empowered to examine them and report to the House on any inconsistencies with any of 
the rights in the bill 
It also recommended that the committee be empowered to examine and 
report on inconsistencies in "any enactments ... either on its own initiative or on 
receipt of a written complaint from a member of the public".
163 Therefore, it 
arguable that it was envisaged that a bill would be monitored throughout its 
process, or at least to the select committee stage of its process. 
The former approach would reduce the likelihood of inconsistent 
amendments being introduced and passed at the eleventh hour, which may have 
prevented enactment of the retrospective penalty provision in the Criminal Justice 
Amendment case study. 
The latter approach would check amendments made at second reading and 
at select committee stages. This would arguably have had an impact on 
amendments made to the impugned provisions discussed in the 1999 Bail Bill 
Zealand" [ 1987-1990] XVII AJHR I.8C, 3. 
Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand" [1987-1990] XVII AJHR I. 8C, 11 . 
Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New 
164 
165 
166 
167 
60 
case study. Due to the changes made in the legislative process, discussed 
below,
164 
this system would not have much impact today as it would immediately 
follow the section 7 vet. However, the concept of both a specialised select 
committee and on-going monitoring is as valid, if not more so in an MMP 
environment, today. 
( c) Likelihood of change 
The possibility of on-going monitoring for section 7 consistency has not 
directly arisen since enactment of the Bill of Rights, but a recent change to 
Standing Order 260 (the parallel requirement1
65
) generated debate as to the 
possibility. 
As mentioned above, Standing Order 260 provides that, where a provision 
in a bill appears to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act, the Attorney-
General shall indicate to the House what the provision is and how it appears to be 
inconsistent with the Act, before a motion for the bill ' s second reading is 
moved. 166 
In 1999, a number of changes were implemented as a result of a revision 
of the Standing Orders 167, the most significant being a change to the order of the 
legislative process. Pursuant to the 1999 Standing Orders the second reading of a 
bill now occurs after a bill is reported back from select committee, where 
previously it was before referral to select committee. 
Zealand" [ 1987-1990] XVII AJHR I. 8C, 11. 
The 1999 Standing Orders changed the order of the legislative process. This change is discussed 
in more detail in Part V.A.4(c) of this paper. 
Discussed in Part Il .F of this paper. 
House of Representatives Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (Wellington, 1999), 
so 260(1). 
House of Representatives Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (Wellington, 1996). 
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Prior to the amendments, the section 7 report and the Standing Orders 
requirements were treated as a single reporting function. As a result of the 
changes, there was a concern that, inadvertently168, the Attorney-General would 
be required to report twice to the House regarding Bill of Rights consistency; 
once, before or upon introduction pursuant to the section 7 requirement, and 
again, following select committee consideration and report, prior to second 
reading, pursuant to Standing Order 260. Implementation of a dual reporting 
system would necessitate the monitoring of the progress of bills beyond 
consideration and amendment by a select committee. 
The MoJ assessed the implications of a dual reporting function . The 
Ministry' s conclusions and recommendations against implementation are 
illustrative of the likely arguments against the implementation of on-going 
monitoring for the purposes of fulfilling the section 7 obligation. 
The MoJ concluded that such a system would have "resource 
implications"169, requiring more staff (holding specialist legal qualifications and 
experience) at both vetting agencies, 170 due not only to increased workload from 
two vets, but because of existing workload in the form of high priority policy re-
evaluations. Further, it was considered unfavourable to assess select committee 
changes to bills as they would be 
171 
Justice officials were advised by the Clerk of the House that the change in the Attorney-General's 
obligation under the Standing Orders was inadvertent. (Hon Margaret Wilson, Attorney General 
"Request Amendment to Standing Order 260(1) by way ofSessional Order" (Letter to Dr Michael 
Cullen, Leader of the House, 18 May 2000). (Released following request pursuant to the Official 
Information Act 1982)). 
Matthew Palmer, Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public Law) "New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 Vetting: Issues to be Considered" (To Attorney-General, 1 February 2000) 4. (Released 
following request pursuant to the Official Information Act 1982). 
Matthew Palmer, Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public Law) "New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 Vetting" (To Attorney-Genera~ 24 March 2000) 2. (Released following request pursuant to 
the Official Information Act 1982). 
Matthew Palmer, Deputy Secretary for Justice (Public L.aw) "New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 Vetting" {To Attorney-General, 24 March 2000) 2. (Released following request pursuant to 
the Official Information Act 1982). 
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likely to be more public and highly politically charged than the current pre-introduction 
assessment. This [ would] require rigorous quality assurance mechanisms and intensive 
management attention. 
It is submitted that if the existing pre-introduction vetting process 1s 
adequate to safeguard Bill of Rights protections at that stage, the same process is 
adequate to withstand public scrutiny of a vet at a later stage in the legislative 
process. The suggestion that the process would require adjustment if it became 
subject to public scrutiny is, arguably, indicative of inadequacies in the current 
procedure. 
The implementation of on-going monitoring was, at best, deferred. The 
advice to the Attorney General suggested that 
.. . a successful bid for more resourcing in the budget round and the settling down of the 
Ministry's work programme [may] allow the new function to be undertaken in 2001 . 
At the date of writing, there has been no further discussion at the MoJ regarding 
the implementation of on-going monitoring as part of the section 7 obligation. 
B Transparency in the Vetting Process 
Section 7 was not enacted to prevent inconsistent provisions from being 
passed, however, it is arguable that it was intended to, not only, generate 
constructive debate in the House, but be a more convincing legislative obstacle 
than it currently is. This can arguably be achieved by making the section 7 
process more transparent. 
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I Value Judgment 
While the exercise of the vetting role takes place within a legal framework 
it leaves scope for the incorporation of value judgments particularly in the section 
5 assessment, outlined above.172 Indeed the Court from who' s judgment the 
vetting procedure was adopted, placed significant emphasis on this fact. Tipping 
J stated 173 
[ o ]f necessity value judgments will be involved . . . Ultimately, whether the limitation in 
issue can or cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society is a matter 
of judgment ... [made] on behalf of society which it serves and after considering all the 
issues which may have a bearing ... , whether they be social legal moral economic, 
administrative, ethical or otherwise. 
The MoJ vetting-procedure guidelines also acknowledge this aspect of the 
process. It states 174 
[t]he issues that anse in the vetting process are frequently complex, and in many 
circumstances it is possible to reasonably hold competing points of view as to whether a 
provision does or does not infringe the provisions of the Bill of Rights Act. 
In light of the subjective nature of the assessment, and given the 
adversarial nature of not only our courts but our Parliament, it is interesting that 
unilateral arguments are presented to the Attorney-General for consideration. In 
the interests of procedural fairness, to use an analogous judicial review principle, 
the tendering of alternative outcomes of the section 5 analysis to the Attorney-
General, (and the tabling of alternative approaches in Parliament for constructive 
debate), particularly in borderline cases, for example the 1999 bail bill case study. 
See Part III .C.2 of this paper. 
Moonen v Film literature Board of Review, above, 16-17. 
Ministry of Justice "BORA Vetting" (Draft) (To Attorney-General, 22 November 1999) 3. 
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In that case study, I submit there was clear evidence of alternative, non-
inconsistent measures which could be implemented to achieve the objective. For 
example, a re-arrangement of the "just cause" criteria would establish previous 
criminal history as a mandatory consideration rather than the discretionary factor 
it is as enacted. Further, a flaw in the incumbent bail system was the lack of 
information available to judges at bail hearings. This was markedly improved 
with the introduction of the Bail Act 2000. Time would have proved its 
effectiveness in achieving the objective. Also, immediately prior to the 
introduction of the Bill a Judges Practice Note implemented changes providing 
greater time to prepare for bail hearings, which also would have proved effective 
over time. Further, implementation of the proposal that bail hearings for serious 
offenders be heard before a High Court Judge would have raised the status of the 
hearings for this group offenders, arguably making it inherently harder for the 
targeted group of offenders to receive bail. The Bail Act 2000 also introduced the 
right of the prosecution to appeal a bail decision, where previously it was a 
defence right only. The above, separately and certainly cumulatively, provide 
scope to achieve the objective without impairing rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights Act. 
Because of the limited information released to the author, (a one line 
assurance that the reverse onus provisions are justified
175
), it is not known 
whether the above factors were considered and adequately refuted, or not 
considered at all. 
rn Michael Hodgen and Andrew Butler (Crown Counsel) "The Bail Bill 1999" (Advice to Attorney-
General 28 May 1999). (Privilege waived and released on request.) 
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2 Appearance of bias 
The current vetting procedures specifically attempt to eradicate any 
conflict of interest of the vetting agency by requiring CLO to vet MoJ sponsored 
bills. However, on judicial review principles, this strategy hardly removes the 
appearance of bias. The substance of justice bills, for example those 
implementing criminal justice policy, affects directly the same Crown Law 
officers who vet the proposed legislation. The underlying principle in bias is that 
a person cannot be judge in their own cause, but, in a section 7 context, a 
provision the CLO vet today is a provision they enforce as prosecutors tomorrow. 
CLO should be in the position of submissioners in these situations as they are 
akin to any other interested party. 
However, any specialist body established for the purposes of vetting 
would be established by the Crown which may inherently import bias. Arguably a 
specialist (Bill of Rights) select committee, like the one envisaged by the select 
committee considering the White Paper discussed above 
176
, would remove the 
appearance of bias, particularly in an MMP political environment. To further 
remove unfairness, its membership could be, not proportional to party 
representatives in the House, but manifested in equal representation, for example 
constituted by one representative from each elected party. The details of the 
select committee consideration would then be tabled in the House ( and, therefore, 
in the public arena) for debate and preparation for standard select committee 
procedures. Having members of the vetting team in the House when the report is 
tabled would allow for more rigorous and fervent debate of the outcome. 
Arguably, at least, the appearance of bias presents a strong argument for 
transparency in the process, particularly in light of the subjective nature of the 
section 5 analysis. 
See Part V.A.4(b) ofthis paper. 
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3 Primafacie Inconsistencies 
As mentioned earlier,177 current practice implements a high threshold 
approach, tabling a report only when unjustified inconsistencies are identified. At 
best, this places only a limited amount of infonnation before the House, and in 
many cases no information is presented, and therefore debated, as a consequence 
of the high threshold test. 178 
It is arguable that prima facie inconsistencies should be identified to the 
House, leaving the House to debate through a section 5 analysis. This would also 
place that inquiry firmly in the public arena, where the public could see section 7 
working. The MoJ consider that the reporting of prima facie inconsistencies 
would result in the reporting of minor technical breaches which would be 
administratively cumbersome. Arguably, however, administrative difficulties 
should not be a reason to dispel effective means of protecting fundamental human 
rights. 
Further, the high threshold approach prevents an objective of the Bill of 
Rights Act from being achieved, that is, to prevent "small erosions of basic rights 
d f: d 
,, 179 
an ree oms . 
4 Erosion of Protected Rights 
The case studies provide illustrations of two ways previous vets have been 
used to further erode protected rights. 
See Part II.A of this paper. 
See Paul Fitzgerald, above, 143 . 
Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984-1985) AJHR J.A6. 
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Where an arguably inconsistent prov1s1on has been enacted and 
implemented and the public's behaviour as been altered, the evidence arising 
from the altered behaviour can be used to re-enact arguably inconsistent 
provtstons. The earlier provision may have been enacted before or after 
enactment of the Bill of Rights Act. An example of the latter are the random 
breath screening provisions in our Land Transport legislation. 
In 1991, the Transport Safety Bill received a section 7 report from the 
Attorney-General identifying inconsistencies in proposed random breath-
screening provisions. However, in that instance, Parliament chose not to accept 
the Attorney-General's advice and enacted the impugned breath-screening 
provisions. The Land Transport Bill 1997 proposed to enact the same provisions, 
but were required to be re-vetted pursuant to section 7. The Ministry of Justice 
concluded 180 
that [the] provisions still [constituted] aprimafacie infringement of sections 21 and 22 
of the Bill of Rights Act. However, there now [appeared] to be sufficient evidence, in 
terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, to justify the limits that they impose on the 
rights provided for in sections 21 and 22. 
Infringement was deemed to be justifiable because
181 
[t]he Oakes test does not present the same difficulties as it did when random breath 
screening was initially introduced as there is now some evidence to suggest that it has a 
deterrent effect somewhat greater than the pre-existing system 
Mark Gobb~ Legal Adviser (Ministry of Justice) "Random Breath Screening Provisions in the 
Land Transport Bill 1997" (Advice to Attorney-General, 19 November 1997). (Privilege waived 
and released on request.) 
Mark Gobb~ Legal Adviser (Ministry of Justice) "Random Breath Screening Provisions in the 
Land Transport Bill 1997" (Advice to Attorney-General, 19 November 1997). (Privilege waived 
and released on request.) 
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An inconsistent provision enacted prior to enactment of the Bill of Rights 
Act was used in the 1999 Bail Bill case study to justify, not only re-enactment of 
the previous breaching provision, but an extension of it. 
At second reading the Minister of Justice announced
182 
we have retained the Crimes Act provision that reverses the onus for serious violent 
offenders. .. . We want to extend this reverse onus further to serious offences not 
involving violence, committed while on bail. 
This was the approach taken even m light of statistics which 
illustrated the extent of the inconsistency and erosion of the public's rights. 
Stephen Franks informed the House at the bill's third reading that
183 
on the statistics both Ministers have, only 43% of those this legislation is 
intended to hold would commit a new offence if they were out. Fifty-seven 
percent would not and under the new law, 141 people will now be held for an 
average of 432 extra days - more than a year each - on custodial remand. Eighty 
of those 141 would not have offended. One hundred and twelve will spend an 
average of 34 days each in custody and then be acquitted or not even sentenced to 
imprisonment. 
5 Judicial Interpretation 
Despite the normally cautious approach to section 6 interpretation by the 
judiciary Andrew Butler, Crown Counsel and Bill of Rights vetter at CLO, has 
indicated reliance on section 6 at the vetting stage by stating 
184 
[i]n a good many cases, bills receive a positive vet only because officials in the Ministry of 
Justice and Crown Law Office have anticipated that, not withstanding its language, the 
Hon Tony Ryall (I June 1999) 578 NZPD l 7240. · 
Stephen Franks (4 October 2000) 587 NZPD 5907. 
Andrew S Butler "Strengthening the Bill of Rights" (2000) 31 VUWLR 129, 146. 
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measure will be interpreted by the Courts in accordance with the direction in section 6. In 
tum, this advice is made available to the Attorney-General ( usually emphasised in the body 
of the advice letter tendered to the Attorney) and is the basis of the Attorney's advice to 
Cabinet that the Bill raises no Bill of Rights issues and should proceed. 
This approach by vetters, in light of the judiciary' s cautious approach to 
section 6, presents a persuasive argument for transparency in the vetting 
procedure. Currently, vetting documentation is not provided to the Court to aid in 
the interpretation of prima facie inconsistent provisions, despite the value m 
providing such information to them . A5 further pointed out by Butler, 
185 
that advice could indicate to counsel and court the possible uses of section 6 in the 
context of the measure as enacted and could well make the difference in persuading the 
court to rely on section 6 of the Bill of Rights in preference to section 4. 
6 Accountability 
Transparency in the process is arguably an effective mechanism to achieve 
a level of accountability of section 7's major players . 
(a) The accountability of the Attorney-General 
A worrymg aspect of section 7 is the lack of accountability of the 
Attorney-General in the process. Outside Parliament, Article 27 of the White 
Paper, in the context of a supreme Bill of Rights Act, provided for the Attorney-
General to intervene in legal proceedings to justify inconsistent legislation and 
prevent it from being struck down by the judiciary. While the Justice and Law 
Reform committee derogated from the idea of the Bill of Rights as supreme law, 
they recommended the retention of the Article 27 requirement. They arguably 
envisaged accountability outside Parliament by requiring the Attorney-General to 
Andrew S Butler "Strengthening the Bill of Rights" (2000) 31 VUWLR 129, 146. 
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justify an inconsistent provision, and therefore defend the section 7 vet, in legal 
proceedings. This recommendation was not implemented and so the Attomey-
General 's actions remain isolated, unquestionable by the House, the courts or the 
public. 
Paul Fitzgerald (writing in 1992) was uncertain whether the A-G, acting 
pursuant to section 7, could be the subject of judicial review, but opined that186 
[a] right of review [would] be a useful tool for ensuring that compliance decisions during 
the scrutiny process are correct. 
This possibility has since been addressed by the Courts and dispelled. As 
mentioned earlier, section 7 does not create a right enforceable by a citizen who is 
affected by a decision of the Attorney-General which results in (allegedly) 
inconsistent provisions being enacted. 
187 
However, a citizen can litigate to expose an inconsistent provision but, as 
yet, there is no adequate remedy in light of section 4. The possibility of 
declarations of inconsistency has not been finally accepted by the judiciary 
despite continued advocacy of some of its members.
188 
However, in light of 
clauses 5 and 6 in the Human Rights Amendment Bill 
189
, it is arguable that 
Parliament are finally acknowledging the potential. 
Although a New Zealand citizen has recourse to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee on the basis that the NZ government has breached their 
covenant rights the expense alone means access to this type of recourse is limited 
to a small portion of society. 
Fitzgerald, above, 149. 
Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General, above. 
Most notably, Thomas J. See Quilter v Attorney-General above (CA); R v Poumako 
above (CA) and R v Pora above (CA). 
Human Rights Amendment Bill 2001 , 152-1 . 
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(b) The accountability of Government 
It is said that 190 
It is the very essence of democracy that it allows for people to hold differing views on 
controversial issues, and for the democratically elected Government of the day to adopt a 
standpoint thereon but for which of course it must take responsibility in the normal way at 
the next election 
and that191 
Parliamentary sovereignty [and, in New Zealand, section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act] 
means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of 
human rights ... . The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are ultimately politica~ 
not legal 
However, this type of accountability will not always redress breaches of 
minority group' s fundamental human rights. An election instead could indicate 
that the majority of the public are apathetic toward the breach, or simply don ' t 
know about the breach. There is also the possibility that the majority of the 
public will agree with taking away the rights of some individuals. This is 
particularly true of rights attaching to charged defendants of alleged criminal 
activity, who the public (and the majority of Parliament) label "criminals". 
In fact, Parliament often use this sector of society to mandate the 
enactment of inconsistent provisions. Hansard evidences this approach in debate 
of the 1999 bail bill where there was continua; reference to the public ' s desire for 
Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1985] AJHR I.A6, 
para 6.17 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (HL) 
Lord Hoffinan. 
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the proV1s10ns.
192 
However, the extent of the submissions on the impugned 
provisions, and bill as a whole, do not support these references. Only eight 
submissions were received and considered at select committee on the bill. 
Further, members relied on public feeling evidenced in the citizens referenda 
presented by Norm Withers an indirect victim of violence administered to his 
mother. However, the support shown in that referenda was for truth in sentencing 
legislation (which was dropped by the Government) and not bail provisions. 
7 Section 7 and the Executive 
It has been suggested that negotiations pnor to the section 7 vet, in 
accordance with it, prevent numerous inconsistencies from becoming an issue at a 
bill's introduction and beyond. However, in light of the case studies which 
illustrate that inconsistent provisions are still enacted, (whether purposefully or 
inadvertently), this is not evidence publicly and, further, the argument does not 
counteract the many other issues presented in this paper. 
8 Transparency as an option 
Earlier this year the current Attorney-General, Hon Margaret Wilson, 
announced her intention to implement a policy of transparency within the section 
7 procedure. All vetting documentation (positive and negative) was to be 
published on-line, on the MoJ website. This was to be implemented by August 
2001. At that time, the Attorney-General rescinded. Ironically, the reasons for 
her decision are being withheld, even from MoJ officials. 
It should be noted that vetting officials at MoJ and CLO advocate 
transparency in the process. 
For example, the speeches of Hon Tony RyalJ ( 1 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17239- I 724 I ; Hon Phil_ 
Goff ( I June 1999) 578 NZPD l 724 I -17243 and ( 4 October 2000) 587 NZPD 5902; and Patnc1a 
Schnauer ( I June I 999) 578 NZPD l 7243-17244. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
While section 7 is generating preliminary debate in the House on Bill of 
Rights issues, its potential as a constitutional safeguard is being limited by timing 
and transparency flaws identified in Part V of this paper. 
The case studies illustrate that a single vet occumng at a bill ' s 
introduction is failing to provide adequate information to the House, beyond 
select committee consideration, for debate of Bill of Rights consistency issues in 
the numerous inevitable amendments throughout a bill ' s legislative process. 
They illustrate that the timing of the vet, and the approach taken by the House to 
section 7 issues, has relegated section 7 reports to the status of a select committee 
submission. The effect is the circumvention of debate in the House by 
determining consistency issues in select committee. 
The case studies illustrate that there are currently inadequate alternative 
mechanisms to prevent "inadvertent" enactment of inconsistent provisions 
resulting from amendment subsequent to the section 7 vet. This suggests the 
need for on-going section 7 monitoring which was arguably envisaged by the 
drafters of section 7. 
The lack of transparency in the section 7 process not only prevents the 
public from seeing the provision working, but impedes Parliamentary debate and 
judicial interpretation. 
The value judgment inherent in the Moonen vetting procedure, evident 
specifically in the 1999 Bail Bill case study, provides evidence that more options 
should be tendered to the Attorney-General, and tabled in the House, or that 
74 
importing a lower threshold test, identifying and debating pnma facie 
inconsistencies, would fulfil section 7's purpose more successfully. 
The appearance of bias within the vetting agencies (particularly CLO) 
suggests the need for transparency in the system. Further, the agencies' prediction 
of subsequent judicial interpretation of a provision as a determining factor in the 
vetting procedure justifies the need for transparency; the provision of currently 
privileged information to the Courts to aid their application of section 4 and 6 of 
the Bill of Rights. 
Transparency would increase accountability of the Attorney-General and 
the House, which would, in turn, aid in effecting section 7's purpose by 
strengthening the procedures to withstand public scrutiny. 
In conclusion, while section 7 was not intended to prevent inconsistent 
provisions from being enacted, (section 4 and the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Supremacy are testament to that), it was implemented for the purpose of diluting 
the effect of an ordinary, repeatable, Bill of Rights. It was intended to generate 
constructive debate and, arguably, to create a more convincing obstacle to the 
enactment of inconsistent provisions than it is currently manifesting. Currently, 
both purposes are being achieved to only a limited extent. On-going monitoring 
of bills and procedural transparency would arguably transform section 7 from an 
orange plastic cone charged with blocking a highway, to a full armed defenders 
highway closure. 
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